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fact situations. Events leading up to the transaction and subsequent
thereto are all important in deciding cases of this type. Under the
circumstances presented in the principal case it does not seem un-
reasonable. to say that a day or two is sufficient period of possession
in the vendee so as to give "notice to the world."
Had the facts of this case arisen a few months later the result
would have been determined by the Certificate of Title law which
did not become effective until January I, 1939.11 However, since
that law is applicable only to motor vehicles the question is still open
where the sale of other chattels is involved. While the case is weak
and indecisive on some points, it would seem that the interpretation
given in the principal case of Section 25 of the Sales Act is correct.
G. O. A.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
STATUTORY TORT LIABILITY UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE
LAWS-EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Plaintiff, as administrator, brought an action against a board
of county commissioners for the death of his decedent. Death re-
sulted from the negligent operation of a motor truck by an employee
of the defendant while driving the truck to its final destination from
the place of technical ,delivery. Jury trial resulted in a verdict for
plaintiff, but the court entered judgment non obstante verdicto. Qn
appeal held, reversed, liability being predicated upon the Michigan
Motor Vehicle Statute I which makes the owners of "motor vehicles"
liable for injuries occasioned by their negligent operation. Miller
v. County Bd. of Road Comm'rs, 297 Mich. 487, 298 N. W. io5
(i94i).
Defendant's immunity was conceded under the common-law rule
of non-liability in the exercise of governmental functions. The issue
in the principal case was, therefore, solely as to whether the Michigan
legislature intended in the adoption of its motor vehicle legislation
to subject municipal and public quasi-corporations to responsibility
for tortious conduct in the operation of their vehicles. As the law
U OHio G. C. Sec. 6290.2 et seq.
1 MiCH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §9. 1431 (definition of "motor vehicle"),
9. 1446 (statutory liability for negligent operation).
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was originally enacted in 1915, the legislative intent was, if anything,
to broaden the common-law rule of immunity. "The term motor
vehicle as used in this act except where otherwise expressly provided,
shall include all vehicles propelled by any power other than muscular
power, except motorcycles operated by policemen and firemen on
official business, also all motor vehicles including trucks owned and
operated by municipalities." 2 But because another section of this
automobile law required that adequate horns be attached to the ve-
hicles of municipalities, an effort was made, in Wrighton v. City of
Highland Park,3 to imply liability despite the definitional wording.
The attempt was unavailing, the Michigan high court declaring that
"if the Legislature had intended to change that rule of law, it would
not have done so in the uncertain way suggested by counsel." 4 How-
ever, by an amendment of 1925 the definition of motor vehicles was
altered; "The term 'motor vehicles'," was now to "include all vehicles
impelled on public highways of this state by mechanical power except
traction engines, road rollers, fire trucks and apparatus owned by any
person, firm or private corporation and used for fire protection and
moto vehicles owned and operated by the Federal government." 5
Bitler v. City of Grand Rapids 6 ruled against a vigorous effort to
find in the amended provision a renunciation of municipal immunity.
The court found insufficient evidence of a legislative change of view-
point, relying heavily upon the principle enunciated in the Wrighton
case. Yet, six years later, it now repudiates the Butler decision and
holds the defendant to liability in tort, thus imposing a significant
range of new liability upon Michigan cities and other poltical sub-
divisions.
Despite this basis in the history of the statute for a conclusion
that its present wording adequately spells out legislatively imposed,
liability, the court chose rather to infer statutory alteration of the
immunity rule of the common law from a questionable cross-inter-
relation of motor vehicle statutes, buttressed by a seldom-invoked
rule of statutory interpretation. A later section in the Michigan
statutory compilation does specifically make "The provisions of this
1 MI C H. COmP. L.ws (1915) §4797.
'236 Mich. 279, 210 N. W. 250 (1926).
'Cf. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 Mich. 465, 235 N. W. 221 (1931),
where a similarly unsuccessful effort was made to find legislative intent to abrogate the
common law doctrine.
'I M'icH. Comp. LAWS (1929) §4632.
'273 Mich. 674, 263 N. W. 767 (1935).
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act applicable ...to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated
by this state or any county, city, town ... " 7 But the act to which
reference is made is the uniform motor vehicle act, separate in legis-
lative origins and in purpose from the motor vehicle law; the former
concerns manual operation of vehicles, while the latter is concerned
with their registration and regulation. To strengthen this tenuous
reasoning,8 the like of which had been so quickly rejected in the
earlier Wrighton litigation, the present court fell back upon the prop-
osition that the general rule of statutory interpretation which exempts
the sovereign unless specifically named, is inapplicable to legislation
enacted for "the public good, the advancement of religion and jus-
tice, and the prevention of injury and wrong." This exception,
although of ancient lineage,9 has been so little invoked that its scope
is shrouded in doubt.10 Its major use in recent years appears to
have been in the wire-tapping case of Nardone v. United States,"
where a majority of the Federal Supreme Court held federal officers
to be embraced within a Congressional prohibition on the divulging
of intercepted communications, because "the sovereign is embraced
by general words of a statute intended to prevent injury and wrong. '12
Governmental immunity from tort liability, no less than governmental
wire-tapping, involves, to many, "a grave wrong." Yet, historically
considered, that immunity, direct derivative that it is from the theory
of a king incapable of doing wrong, represents a prerogative of sov-
ereignty quite as much as does state freedom from general statutes
of limitation, which the Nardone opinion denominates as a "classical
instance" of the general rule of exclusion of government where its
sovereignty, prerogatives or interests are involved.' 3  Nor, seemingly,
is the issue any better resolved by reliance upon that portion of the
statement of the exception which speaks of laws for "the general
T MIcE. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1937) §9. 1592.
SBut see Note (1942) 136 A. L. R. 582, which includes the statute involved in the
principal case in a general annotation of "only those statutes which specifically mention
municipal corporations as being liable for the negligent operation of vehicles."
11 Magdalen College Case, 11 Coke 66b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1235 (1615).
. See the discussion in BLACK, INTERPrETATION OF LAWS (2d ed. 1911) §36, which
covers as well as any secondary source the general rule of interpretation and its exception.
302 U. S. 379 (1937).
12 Id. at 384.
3Contrast, as to the Nardone ruling itself, (1938) 12 ST. JoaN's L. Rrv. 352, at
354-55, which finds the exception for prevention of "injury and wrong" satisfied by the
long established view of wire-tapping as reprehensible, with (1938) 16 TEx. L. Rev. 574,
at 575, which, on the basis of representative cases pricking out the line between rule and
exception, questions the Court's conclusions in the fact situation before it.
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good"; this in part because of the less secure basis for it '1 and in
part because its all-inclusiveness would, without external delimita-
tion, swallow up the very rule it is supposed to modify.'5
The facts of the instant case would more naturally suggest resort
to the rule of statutory interpretation which concerns the treatment
of state political subdivisions where legislation is inexplicit. Thus,
although sovereigns are not restrained by general statutes of limi-
tation, the judicial tendency is to hold the contrary in the case of
municipal corporations.' A similar trend is discernible with respect
to taxing laws " and even criminal legislation.' 8 Public quasi cor-
porations, like the instant defendant, as distinct from municipal cor-
porations, are ordinarily conceived of as more possessive of elements
of sovereignty owing to their involuntary relation to the state. Yet
here also there is apparent a tendency to regard them as within legis-
lative intendment unless specifically excluded.' Possibly the reason
for the Michigan Court's failure to invoke this specific rule of inter-
pretation for political subdivisions is to be found in its earlier deter-
mination, in City of IVyandotte v. State Board of Tax Adnin.,'0 that
municipal utility sales were not subject to state sales taxation despite
a generalized but comprehensive definitional coverage. By falling
"' No refer nce is made to such a ground in the generative case of 'agdalen College,
supra note 9. Appearing in Bacon's Abridgement, it is requoted in some cases and texts,
e. g., United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840), but is avoided by BLACK, loc. cit.
supra note 10; Nardone v. United States, supra note 11.
1; Note how by the rcasoning of the principal case, 297 Mich. at -, 298 N. W. at
108, any exercise of the police power is "for the benefit of the public and the prevention
of unrecompensed injury . . ." And surely any taxing act satisfying the public purpose
requirement would be equally for "the public good." It is probably the limitless scope
of the exception as thus defined that leads 'MAxWELL, INTERPRETATION Or STATUTzS (7th
ed. 1929) 121, for greater accuracy to rephrase it to cover all legislation where neither
the Sovereign's "prerogative, rights, nor property are in question"; and (1938) 86 U. oF
PA. L. Rcv. 436, to narrow it still further.
"J The leading case is probably Metropolitan R. R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1
(189). For collection of cas s, see Note (1938) 113 A. L. R. 376. A recent case of
opposite view is In re Erney's Estate, 337 Pa. 542, 12 A. (2d) 333 (1940).
17 Recent cases are collected in SrASONGOOD, CASPS ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d
ed. 1941) 26 n.; Note (1937) 111 A. L. R. 185, 205-208.
'J Cf. Union Pacific R. R. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450 (1941) (liability of munici-
pality under Ellkins Act).
13 Covington County v. O'Neal, 239 Ala. 322, 195 So. 234 (1940) (statute of limitation);
Emery v. Holt County, 345 Mo. 223, 132 S. W. (2d) 970 (1939) (same); State ex rel.
Board of Education v. Gibson, 130 Ohio St. 318, 199 N. E. 185 (1935) (same); State v.
xvoodbury County, 222 Iowa 488, 269 N. W. 449 (1936), and other cases there cited
(tax statutes). Contra: O'Beery v. Mecklenberg County, 198 N. C. 357, 151 S. E. 880
(1930) (taxing law); Lancaster v. Gray County, 127 S. NV. (2d) 385 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) (laches).
- 278 Mfich. 47, 270 N. IV. 211 (1936).
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back on the less pertinent rule of interpretation the court was able
to achieve a result which Matthews v. City of Detroit 21 had, shortly
before, indicated was close to its heart, without sacrificing its appar-
ently equally pronounced view on the "well-established rule of exemp-
tion of municipal property from general taxation." 22
J. L. R.
TAXATION
DEFINITION OF "MANUFACTURING" FOR DIFFERENTIAL
VALUATION UNDER OHIO TANGIBLE PERSONALTY
TAX LAW
Taxpayer is engaged in the processing of scrap metal to meet the
elaborate specifications of the American Rolling Mill Co., which uses
the scrap metal so processed to charge its open hearth furnaces. The
processing activity of appellant involves the careful segregation of the
various scrap metals acquired, removal of dross, silica, alloy, and
paint as required, cutting of the odd scraps into uniform size by me-
chanical shears, and packing them into compact, uniform bundles with
hydraulic presses. Claiming to be a "manufacturer" within the pro-
visions of Ohio General Code Section 5385, the taxpayer listed its
personal property in its inventory for taxation at 50% of the true
value thereof, as authorized by Section 5388. The tax commissioner,
in a determination sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, denied the
classification of a manufacturer and assessed the property at 70% of
true value according to the general rule for valuation of personalty.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed; appellant is taxable
as a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the code section."
Section 5385, defining a manufacturer to be "A person who pur-
chases, receives, or holds personal property, of any description, for
the purpose of adding to the value thereof by manufacturing, refining,
-291 Mich. 161, 289 N. W. 115 (1939), carrying to questionable lengths the Michigan
doctrine that evidence of "profit" works legal alchemy on a function normally govern-
mental.
21 City of Wyandotte v. State Board of Tax Admn., supra note 20, at 54, 270 N. V.
at 213.
1Middletown Iron & Steel Co. v. Evatt, Tax Comm., 139 Ohio St. 113, 38 N. E.
(2d) 585 (1941).
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